upstream u-boot with additional patches for our devices/boards: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2017-March/282789.html (AXP crashes) ; Gbit ethernet patch for some LIME2 revisions ; with SPI flash support
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u-boot/arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c

652 lines
15 KiB

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
/*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2015 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
*/
#include <common.h>
#include <config.h>
#include <fuse.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/arch/clock.h>
#include <asm/arch/sys_proto.h>
imx: reorganize IMX code as other SOCs Change is consistent with other SOCs and it is in preparation for adding SOMs. SOC's related files are moved from cpu/ to mach-imx/<SOC>. This change is also coherent with the structure in kernel. Signed-off-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> CC: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> CC: Akshay Bhat <akshaybhat@timesys.com> CC: Ken Lin <Ken.Lin@advantech.com.tw> CC: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com> CC: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de> CC: "Sébastien Szymanski" <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com> CC: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com> CC: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de> CC: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com> CC: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com> CC: Nikita Kiryanov <nikita@compulab.co.il> CC: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> CC: "Eric Bénard" <eric@eukrea.com> CC: Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com> CC: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com> CC: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> CC: Adrian Alonso <adrian.alonso@nxp.com> CC: Alison Wang <b18965@freescale.com> CC: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com> CC: Martin Donnelly <martin.donnelly@ge.com> CC: Marcin Niestroj <m.niestroj@grinn-global.com> CC: Lukasz Majewski <lukma@denx.de> CC: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com> CC: "Albert ARIBAUD (3ADEV)" <albert.aribaud@3adev.fr> CC: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> CC: Soeren Moch <smoch@web.de> CC: Richard Hu <richard.hu@technexion.com> CC: Wig Cheng <wig.cheng@technexion.com> CC: Vanessa Maegima <vanessa.maegima@nxp.com> CC: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com> CC: Stefan Agner <stefan.agner@toradex.com> CC: Markus Niebel <Markus.Niebel@tq-group.com> CC: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> CC: Francesco Montefoschi <francesco.montefoschi@udoo.org> CC: Jaehoon Chung <jh80.chung@samsung.com> CC: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net> CC: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com> CC: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> CC: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> CC: "Andrew F. Davis" <afd@ti.com> CC: "Łukasz Majewski" <l.majewski@samsung.com> CC: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@st.com> CC: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org> CC: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> CC: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> CC: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com> CC: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> CC: "Álvaro Fernández Rojas" <noltari@gmail.com> CC: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com> CC: Xiaoliang Yang <xiaoliang.yang@nxp.com> CC: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org> CC: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> CC: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> CC: Filip Brozovic <fbrozovic@gmail.com> CC: Petr Kulhavy <brain@jikos.cz> CC: Eric Nelson <eric@nelint.com> CC: Bai Ping <ping.bai@nxp.com> CC: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com> CC: Sanchayan Maity <maitysanchayan@gmail.com> CC: Lokesh Vutla <lokeshvutla@ti.com> CC: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@st.com> CC: Gary Bisson <gary.bisson@boundarydevices.com> CC: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> CC: u-boot@lists.denx.de Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
8 years ago
#include <asm/mach-imx/hab.h>
#define ALIGN_SIZE 0x1000
#define MX6DQ_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR 0x009024a8
#define MX6DLS_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR 0x00901dd0
#define MX6SL_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR 0x00900a18
#define IS_HAB_ENABLED_BIT \
(is_soc_type(MXC_SOC_MX7ULP) ? 0x80000000 : \
(is_soc_type(MXC_SOC_MX7) ? 0x2000000 : 0x2))
static int ivt_header_error(const char *err_str, struct ivt_header *ivt_hdr)
{
printf("%s magic=0x%x length=0x%02x version=0x%x\n", err_str,
ivt_hdr->magic, ivt_hdr->length, ivt_hdr->version);
return 1;
}
static int verify_ivt_header(struct ivt_header *ivt_hdr)
{
int result = 0;
if (ivt_hdr->magic != IVT_HEADER_MAGIC)
result = ivt_header_error("bad magic", ivt_hdr);
if (be16_to_cpu(ivt_hdr->length) != IVT_TOTAL_LENGTH)
result = ivt_header_error("bad length", ivt_hdr);
if (ivt_hdr->version != IVT_HEADER_V1 &&
ivt_hdr->version != IVT_HEADER_V2)
result = ivt_header_error("bad version", ivt_hdr);
return result;
}
#if !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD)
#define MAX_RECORD_BYTES (8*1024) /* 4 kbytes */
struct record {
uint8_t tag; /* Tag */
uint8_t len[2]; /* Length */
uint8_t par; /* Version */
uint8_t contents[MAX_RECORD_BYTES];/* Record Data */
bool any_rec_flag;
};
static char *rsn_str[] = {
"RSN = HAB_RSN_ANY (0x00)\n",
"RSN = HAB_ENG_FAIL (0x30)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_ADDRESS (0x22)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_ASSERTION (0x0C)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_CALL (0x28)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_CERTIFICATE (0x21)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_COMMAND (0x06)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_CSF (0x11)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_DCD (0x27)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_INDEX (0x0F)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_IVT (0x05)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_KEY (0x1D)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_RETURN (0x1E)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_SIGNATURE (0x18)\n",
"RSN = HAB_INV_SIZE (0x17)\n",
"RSN = HAB_MEM_FAIL (0x2E)\n",
"RSN = HAB_OVR_COUNT (0x2B)\n",
"RSN = HAB_OVR_STORAGE (0x2D)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_ALGORITHM (0x12)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_COMMAND (0x03)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_ENGINE (0x0A)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_ITEM (0x24)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_KEY (0x1B)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_PROTOCOL (0x14)\n",
"RSN = HAB_UNS_STATE (0x09)\n",
"RSN = INVALID\n",
NULL
};
static char *sts_str[] = {
"STS = HAB_SUCCESS (0xF0)\n",
"STS = HAB_FAILURE (0x33)\n",
"STS = HAB_WARNING (0x69)\n",
"STS = INVALID\n",
NULL
};
static char *eng_str[] = {
"ENG = HAB_ENG_ANY (0x00)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_SCC (0x03)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_RTIC (0x05)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_SAHARA (0x06)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_CSU (0x0A)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_SRTC (0x0C)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_DCP (0x1B)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_CAAM (0x1D)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_SNVS (0x1E)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_OCOTP (0x21)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_DTCP (0x22)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_ROM (0x36)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_HDCP (0x24)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_RTL (0x77)\n",
"ENG = HAB_ENG_SW (0xFF)\n",
"ENG = INVALID\n",
NULL
};
static char *ctx_str[] = {
"CTX = HAB_CTX_ANY(0x00)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_FAB (0xFF)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_ENTRY (0xE1)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_TARGET (0x33)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_AUTHENTICATE (0x0A)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_DCD (0xDD)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_CSF (0xCF)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_COMMAND (0xC0)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_AUT_DAT (0xDB)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_ASSERT (0xA0)\n",
"CTX = HAB_CTX_EXIT (0xEE)\n",
"CTX = INVALID\n",
NULL
};
static uint8_t hab_statuses[5] = {
HAB_STS_ANY,
HAB_FAILURE,
HAB_WARNING,
HAB_SUCCESS,
-1
};
static uint8_t hab_reasons[26] = {
HAB_RSN_ANY,
HAB_ENG_FAIL,
HAB_INV_ADDRESS,
HAB_INV_ASSERTION,
HAB_INV_CALL,
HAB_INV_CERTIFICATE,
HAB_INV_COMMAND,
HAB_INV_CSF,
HAB_INV_DCD,
HAB_INV_INDEX,
HAB_INV_IVT,
HAB_INV_KEY,
HAB_INV_RETURN,
HAB_INV_SIGNATURE,
HAB_INV_SIZE,
HAB_MEM_FAIL,
HAB_OVR_COUNT,
HAB_OVR_STORAGE,
HAB_UNS_ALGORITHM,
HAB_UNS_COMMAND,
HAB_UNS_ENGINE,
HAB_UNS_ITEM,
HAB_UNS_KEY,
HAB_UNS_PROTOCOL,
HAB_UNS_STATE,
-1
};
static uint8_t hab_contexts[12] = {
HAB_CTX_ANY,
HAB_CTX_FAB,
HAB_CTX_ENTRY,
HAB_CTX_TARGET,
HAB_CTX_AUTHENTICATE,
HAB_CTX_DCD,
HAB_CTX_CSF,
HAB_CTX_COMMAND,
HAB_CTX_AUT_DAT,
HAB_CTX_ASSERT,
HAB_CTX_EXIT,
-1
};
static uint8_t hab_engines[16] = {
HAB_ENG_ANY,
HAB_ENG_SCC,
HAB_ENG_RTIC,
HAB_ENG_SAHARA,
HAB_ENG_CSU,
HAB_ENG_SRTC,
HAB_ENG_DCP,
HAB_ENG_CAAM,
HAB_ENG_SNVS,
HAB_ENG_OCOTP,
HAB_ENG_DTCP,
HAB_ENG_ROM,
HAB_ENG_HDCP,
HAB_ENG_RTL,
HAB_ENG_SW,
-1
};
static inline uint8_t get_idx(uint8_t *list, uint8_t tgt)
{
uint8_t idx = 0;
uint8_t element = list[idx];
while (element != -1) {
if (element == tgt)
return idx;
element = list[++idx];
}
return -1;
}
static void process_event_record(uint8_t *event_data, size_t bytes)
{
struct record *rec = (struct record *)event_data;
printf("\n\n%s", sts_str[get_idx(hab_statuses, rec->contents[0])]);
printf("%s", rsn_str[get_idx(hab_reasons, rec->contents[1])]);
printf("%s", ctx_str[get_idx(hab_contexts, rec->contents[2])]);
printf("%s", eng_str[get_idx(hab_engines, rec->contents[3])]);
}
static void display_event(uint8_t *event_data, size_t bytes)
{
uint32_t i;
if (!(event_data && bytes > 0))
return;
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
if (i == 0)
printf("\t0x%02x", event_data[i]);
else if ((i % 8) == 0)
printf("\n\t0x%02x", event_data[i]);
else
printf(" 0x%02x", event_data[i]);
}
process_event_record(event_data, bytes);
}
static int get_hab_status(void)
{
uint32_t index = 0; /* Loop index */
uint8_t event_data[128]; /* Event data buffer */
size_t bytes = sizeof(event_data); /* Event size in bytes */
enum hab_config config = 0;
enum hab_state state = 0;
hab_rvt_report_event_t *hab_rvt_report_event;
hab_rvt_report_status_t *hab_rvt_report_status;
hab_rvt_report_event = (hab_rvt_report_event_t *)HAB_RVT_REPORT_EVENT;
hab_rvt_report_status =
(hab_rvt_report_status_t *)HAB_RVT_REPORT_STATUS;
if (imx_hab_is_enabled())
puts("\nSecure boot enabled\n");
else
puts("\nSecure boot disabled\n");
/* Check HAB status */
if (hab_rvt_report_status(&config, &state) != HAB_SUCCESS) {
printf("\nHAB Configuration: 0x%02x, HAB State: 0x%02x\n",
config, state);
/* Display HAB Error events */
while (hab_rvt_report_event(HAB_FAILURE, index, event_data,
&bytes) == HAB_SUCCESS) {
puts("\n");
printf("--------- HAB Event %d -----------------\n",
index + 1);
puts("event data:\n");
display_event(event_data, bytes);
puts("\n");
bytes = sizeof(event_data);
index++;
}
}
/* Display message if no HAB events are found */
else {
printf("\nHAB Configuration: 0x%02x, HAB State: 0x%02x\n",
config, state);
puts("No HAB Events Found!\n\n");
}
return 0;
}
static int do_hab_status(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
if ((argc != 1)) {
cmd_usage(cmdtp);
return 1;
}
get_hab_status();
return 0;
}
static int do_authenticate_image(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
ulong addr, length, ivt_offset;
int rcode = 0;
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
if (argc < 4)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 16);
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
length = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 16);
ivt_offset = simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 16);
rcode = imx_hab_authenticate_image(addr, length, ivt_offset);
if (rcode == 0)
rcode = CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
else
rcode = CMD_RET_FAILURE;
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
return rcode;
}
static int do_hab_failsafe(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
hab_rvt_failsafe_t *hab_rvt_failsafe;
if (argc != 1) {
cmd_usage(cmdtp);
return 1;
}
hab_rvt_failsafe = (hab_rvt_failsafe_t *)HAB_RVT_FAILSAFE;
hab_rvt_failsafe();
return 0;
}
static int do_authenticate_image_or_failover(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
int argc, char * const argv[])
{
int ret = CMD_RET_FAILURE;
if (argc != 4) {
ret = CMD_RET_USAGE;
goto error;
}
if (!imx_hab_is_enabled()) {
printf("error: secure boot disabled\n");
goto error;
}
if (do_authenticate_image(NULL, flag, argc, argv) != CMD_RET_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, "authentication fail -> %s %s %s %s\n",
argv[0], argv[1], argv[2], argv[3]);
do_hab_failsafe(0, 0, 1, NULL);
};
ret = CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
error:
return ret;
}
U_BOOT_CMD(
hab_status, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_hab_status,
"display HAB status",
""
);
U_BOOT_CMD(
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
hab_auth_img, 4, 0, do_authenticate_image,
"authenticate image via HAB",
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
"addr length ivt_offset\n"
"addr - image hex address\n"
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
"length - image hex length\n"
"ivt_offset - hex offset of IVT in the image"
);
U_BOOT_CMD(
hab_failsafe, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_hab_failsafe,
"run BootROM failsafe routine",
""
);
U_BOOT_CMD(
hab_auth_img_or_fail, 4, 0,
do_authenticate_image_or_failover,
"authenticate image via HAB on failure drop to USB BootROM mode",
"addr length ivt_offset\n"
"addr - image hex address\n"
"length - image hex length\n"
"ivt_offset - hex offset of IVT in the image"
);
#endif /* !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) */
/* Get CSF Header length */
static int get_hab_hdr_len(struct hab_hdr *hdr)
{
return (size_t)((hdr->len[0] << 8) + (hdr->len[1]));
}
/* Check whether addr lies between start and
* end and is within the length of the image
*/
static int chk_bounds(u8 *addr, size_t bytes, u8 *start, u8 *end)
{
size_t csf_size = (size_t)((end + 1) - addr);
return (addr && (addr >= start) && (addr <= end) &&
(csf_size >= bytes));
}
/* Get Length of each command in CSF */
static int get_csf_cmd_hdr_len(u8 *csf_hdr)
{
if (*csf_hdr == HAB_CMD_HDR)
return sizeof(struct hab_hdr);
return get_hab_hdr_len((struct hab_hdr *)csf_hdr);
}
/* Check if CSF is valid */
static bool csf_is_valid(struct ivt *ivt, ulong start_addr, size_t bytes)
{
u8 *start = (u8 *)start_addr;
u8 *csf_hdr;
u8 *end;
size_t csf_hdr_len;
size_t cmd_hdr_len;
size_t offset = 0;
if (bytes != 0)
end = start + bytes - 1;
else
end = start;
/* Verify if CSF pointer content is zero */
if (!ivt->csf) {
puts("Error: CSF pointer is NULL\n");
return false;
}
csf_hdr = (u8 *)ivt->csf;
/* Verify if CSF Header exist */
if (*csf_hdr != HAB_CMD_HDR) {
puts("Error: CSF header command not found\n");
return false;
}
csf_hdr_len = get_hab_hdr_len((struct hab_hdr *)csf_hdr);
/* Check if the CSF lies within the image bounds */
if (!chk_bounds(csf_hdr, csf_hdr_len, start, end)) {
puts("Error: CSF lies outside the image bounds\n");
return false;
}
do {
struct hab_hdr *cmd;
cmd = (struct hab_hdr *)&csf_hdr[offset];
switch (cmd->tag) {
case (HAB_CMD_WRT_DAT):
puts("Error: Deprecated write command found\n");
return false;
case (HAB_CMD_CHK_DAT):
puts("Error: Deprecated check command found\n");
return false;
case (HAB_CMD_SET):
if (cmd->par == HAB_PAR_MID) {
puts("Error: Deprecated Set MID command found\n");
return false;
}
default:
break;
}
cmd_hdr_len = get_csf_cmd_hdr_len(&csf_hdr[offset]);
if (!cmd_hdr_len) {
puts("Error: Invalid command length\n");
return false;
}
offset += cmd_hdr_len;
} while (offset < csf_hdr_len);
return true;
}
bool imx_hab_is_enabled(void)
{
struct imx_sec_config_fuse_t *fuse =
(struct imx_sec_config_fuse_t *)&imx_sec_config_fuse;
uint32_t reg;
int ret;
ret = fuse_read(fuse->bank, fuse->word, &reg);
if (ret) {
puts("\nSecure boot fuse read error\n");
return ret;
}
return (reg & IS_HAB_ENABLED_BIT) == IS_HAB_ENABLED_BIT;
}
int imx_hab_authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size,
uint32_t ivt_offset)
{
uint32_t load_addr = 0;
size_t bytes;
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
uint32_t ivt_addr = 0;
int result = 1;
ulong start;
hab_rvt_authenticate_image_t *hab_rvt_authenticate_image;
hab_rvt_entry_t *hab_rvt_entry;
hab_rvt_exit_t *hab_rvt_exit;
hab_rvt_check_target_t *hab_rvt_check_target;
struct ivt *ivt;
struct ivt_header *ivt_hdr;
enum hab_status status;
hab_rvt_authenticate_image =
(hab_rvt_authenticate_image_t *)HAB_RVT_AUTHENTICATE_IMAGE;
hab_rvt_entry = (hab_rvt_entry_t *)HAB_RVT_ENTRY;
hab_rvt_exit = (hab_rvt_exit_t *)HAB_RVT_EXIT;
hab_rvt_check_target = (hab_rvt_check_target_t *)HAB_RVT_CHECK_TARGET;
if (!imx_hab_is_enabled()) {
puts("hab fuse not enabled\n");
return 0;
}
printf("\nAuthenticate image from DDR location 0x%x...\n",
ddr_start);
hab_caam_clock_enable(1);
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
/* Calculate IVT address header */
ivt_addr = ddr_start + ivt_offset;
ivt = (struct ivt *)ivt_addr;
ivt_hdr = &ivt->hdr;
/* Verify IVT header bugging out on error */
if (verify_ivt_header(ivt_hdr))
goto hab_authentication_exit;
/* Verify IVT body */
if (ivt->self != ivt_addr) {
printf("ivt->self 0x%08x pointer is 0x%08x\n",
ivt->self, ivt_addr);
goto hab_authentication_exit;
}
/* Verify if IVT DCD pointer is NULL */
if (ivt->dcd)
puts("Warning: DCD pointer should be NULL\n");
start = ddr_start;
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
bytes = image_size;
/* Verify CSF */
if (!csf_is_valid(ivt, start, bytes))
goto hab_authentication_exit;
if (hab_rvt_entry() != HAB_SUCCESS) {
puts("hab entry function fail\n");
goto hab_exit_failure_print_status;
}
status = hab_rvt_check_target(HAB_TGT_MEMORY, (void *)ddr_start, bytes);
if (status != HAB_SUCCESS) {
printf("HAB check target 0x%08x-0x%08x fail\n",
ddr_start, ddr_start + bytes);
goto hab_exit_failure_print_status;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
printf("\nivt_offset = 0x%x, ivt addr = 0x%x\n", ivt_offset, ivt_addr);
printf("ivt entry = 0x%08x, dcd = 0x%08x, csf = 0x%08x\n", ivt->entry,
ivt->dcd, ivt->csf);
puts("Dumping IVT\n");
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
7 years ago
print_buffer(ivt_addr, (void *)(ivt_addr), 4, 0x8, 0);
puts("Dumping CSF Header\n");
print_buffer(ivt->csf, (void *)(ivt->csf), 4, 0x10, 0);
#if !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD)
get_hab_status();
#endif
puts("\nCalling authenticate_image in ROM\n");
printf("\tivt_offset = 0x%x\n", ivt_offset);
printf("\tstart = 0x%08lx\n", start);
printf("\tbytes = 0x%x\n", bytes);
#endif
/*
* If the MMU is enabled, we have to notify the ROM
* code, or it won't flush the caches when needed.
* This is done, by setting the "pu_irom_mmu_enabled"
* word to 1. You can find its address by looking in
* the ROM map. This is critical for
* authenticate_image(). If MMU is enabled, without
* setting this bit, authentication will fail and may
* crash.
*/
/* Check MMU enabled */
if (is_soc_type(MXC_SOC_MX6) && get_cr() & CR_M) {
if (is_mx6dq()) {
/*
* This won't work on Rev 1.0.0 of
* i.MX6Q/D, since their ROM doesn't
* do cache flushes. don't think any
* exist, so we ignore them.
*/
if (!is_mx6dqp())
writel(1, MX6DQ_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR);
} else if (is_mx6sdl()) {
writel(1, MX6DLS_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR);
} else if (is_mx6sl()) {
writel(1, MX6SL_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR);
}
}
load_addr = (uint32_t)hab_rvt_authenticate_image(
HAB_CID_UBOOT,
ivt_offset, (void **)&start,
(size_t *)&bytes, NULL);
if (hab_rvt_exit() != HAB_SUCCESS) {
puts("hab exit function fail\n");
load_addr = 0;
}
hab_exit_failure_print_status:
#if !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD)
get_hab_status();
#endif
hab_authentication_exit:
if (load_addr != 0)
result = 0;
return result;
}