When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So we picked the
area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it
with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry. Since then, the
Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first
line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line)
and with slightly different comment styles than us.
In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility
and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.
This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared
license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag
contents. There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag
and have introduced one.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This patch adds hab_auth_img_or_fail() a command line function that
encapsulates a common usage of authenticate and failover, namely if
authenticate image fails, then drop to BootROM USB recovery mode.
For secure-boot systems, this type of locked down behavior is important to
ensure no unsigned images can be run.
It's possible to script this logic but, when done over and over again the
environment starts get very complex and repetitive, reducing that script
repetition down to a command line function makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
commit 8c4037a09a ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.") makes the DCD field being NULL a
dependency.
This change though will break loading and executing of existing pre-signed
binaries on a u-boot update i.e. if this change is deployed on a board you
will be forced to redo all images on that board to NULL out the DCD.
There is no prior guidance from NXP that the DCD must be NULL similarly
public guidance on usage of the HAB doesn't call out this NULL dependency
(see boundary devices link).
Since later SoCs will reject a non-NULL DCD there's no reason to make a
NULL DCD a requirement, however if there is an actual dependency for later
SoCs the appropriate fix would be to do SoC version checking.
Earlier SoCs are capable (and happy) to authenticate images with non-NULL
DCDs, we should not be forcing this change on downstream users -
particularly if it means those users now must rewrite their build systems
and/or redeploy signed images in the field.
Fixes: 8c4037a09a ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.")
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Link: https://boundarydevices.com/high-assurance-boot-hab-dummies
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Currently the following devices are using a different definition for ROM
Vector Table addresses:
- i.MX6DQP = All rev
- i.MX6DQ >= rev 1.5
- i.MX6SDL >= rev 1.2
There is no need to create a new RVT macros since the only update were the
RVT base address. Remove HAB_RVT_*_NEW macros and define a new RVT base
address.
More details about RVT base address can be found on processors Reference
Manual and in the following documents:
EB803: i.MX 6Dual/6Quad Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.2 to 1.3
Comparison
EB804: i.MX 6Solo/6DualLite Application Processor Silicon Revision 1.1
to 1.2/1.3 Comparison
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Write, Check and Set MID commands have been deprecated from the Code
Signing Tool (CST) v2.3.3 and will not be implemented in newer versions
of HAB, hence the following features are no longer available:
- Write Data
- Clear Mask
- Set Mask
- Check All Clear
- Check All Set
- Check Any Clear
- Check Any Set
- Set MID
The inappropriate use of Write Data command may lead to an incorrect
authentication boot flow. Since no specific application has been identified
that requires the use of any of these features, it is highly recommended to
add this check.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
For proper authentication the HAB code must check if the CSF is valid.
Users must call the csf_is_valid() function to parse the CSF prior to
authenticating any additional images. The function will return a failure
if any of the following invalid conditions are met:
- CSF pointer is NULL
- CSF Header does not exist
- CSF does not lie within the image bounds
- CSF command length zero
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by
the SoC ROM. DCD should not be present in images that will be verified
by software using HAB RVT authentication APIs. Newer versions of HAB
will generate an error if a DCD pointer is present in an image being
authenticated by calling the HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will
process and run DCD if it is present, and this could lead to an incorrect
authentication boot flow.
It is highly recommended this check is in place to ensure additional HAB
verified images do not include a DCD table.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Currently it is not possible to run CMD_DEK on i.MX SPL targets:
=> dek_blob 0x12000000 0x12001000 128
The system hangs after running dek_blob because the CAAM clock is being
disabled by the HAB code. There is no need to disable CAAM clock after
authenticating additional boot images, thus keep CAAM clock enabled to
address this issue.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode.
This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery
mode.
=> hab_failsafe
Shows the i.MX7 appear as "hiddev0,hidraw5: USB HID v1.10 Device [Freescale
SemiConductor Inc SP Blank ULT1] " in a Linux dmesg thus allowing download
of a new image via the BootROM USB download protocol routine.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for
hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address
layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks
will just do nothing and there's definitely a TODO to implement that extra
functionality on the alternative BootROM API.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export
imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in
a secure-boot context.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot
unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the existing usages
of authenticate_image() expect and rely on unlocked boards doing the
following
1. Not calling into the BootROM authenticate_image() callback
2. Returning a pass status for authenticate_image() calls anyway
A previous patch removed the necessity to call into imx_hab_is_enabled()
twice. This patch ensures the reliance on authenticate_image() returning
zero is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to
interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is
renaming the relevant function to match the previously introduced external
naming convention imx_hab_function()
The name imx_hab_is_hab_enabled() is a tautology. A more logical name is
imx_hab_is_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with
imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in
the same way to make the fact we are doing IMX HAB activities clear from
reading the code. authenticate_image() could mean anything
imx_hab_authenticate_image() is on the other hand very explicit.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally.
Make them all static now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even
if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling into the ROM.
This can be confusing.
This patch changes the flow of the code so that the HAB event log is only
printed out if we have called into the ROM and received some sort of status
code.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity
check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over,
prior to making the BootROM authentication callback itself.
This check is recommended by the HAB documentation so it makes sense to
adhere to the guidance and perform that check as directed.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target()
for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case
the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just have HAB_SUCCESS
as a result code. Adding support for the new BootROM callbacks is a TODO.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch enables printout of the IVT entry, dcd and csf data fields.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT gives the absolute address of the CSF. There is no requirement for
the CSF to be located adjacent to the IVT so lets use the address provided
in the IVT header instead of the hard-coded fixed CSF offset currently in
place.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Previous patches added IVT header verification steps. We shouldn't call
hab_rvt_entry() until we have done the basic header verification steps.
This patch changes the time we make the hab_rvt_entry() call so that it
only takes place if we are happy with the IVT header sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT is a self-describing structure which contains a self field. The
self field is the absolute physical base address the IVT ought to be at in
memory. Use the IVT self field to validate the calculated ivt_addr bugging
out if the two values differ.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT header contains a magic number, fixed length and one of two version
identifiers. Validate these settings before doing anything with a putative
IVT binary.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes
- addr - image hex address
- offset - hex offset of IVT in the image
but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats
the second 'offset' parameter as an image length.
Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end
of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4.
This patch fixes this situation by
1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img
- addr : image hex address
- length : total length of the image
- offset : offset of IVT from addr
2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in
arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass
addr, length and IVT offset respectively.
This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified
in the help text and should still allow existing code to work.
It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended
to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example.
Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the
BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images
made by mkimage via HAB.
This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will
focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not
mandated to live at the end of a .imx image.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
CSF_PAD_SIZE should be defined in hab.h, move it to that location now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The size of the IVT header should be defined in hab.h move it there now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The current code disjoins an entire block of code on hab_entry pass/fail
resulting in a large chunk of authenticate_image being offset to the right.
Fix this by checking hab_entry() pass/failure and exiting the function
directly if in an error state.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
There is no need to call is_enabled() twice in authenticate_image - it does
nothing but add an additional layer of indentation.
We can check for is_enabled() at the start of the function and return the
result code directly.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
authenticate_image returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. That result
code is mapped directly to the result code for the command line function
hab_auth_img - which means when hab_auth_img succeeds it is returning
CMD_RET_FAILURE (1) instead of CMD_RET_SUCCESS (0).
This patch fixes this behaviour by making authenticate_image() return 0 for
success and 1 for failure. Both users of authenticate_image() as a result
have some minimal churn. The upshot is once done when hab_auth_img is
called from the command line we set $? in the standard way for scripting
functions to act on.
Fixes: 36c1ca4d46 ("imx: Support i.MX6 High Assurance Boot
authentication")
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Both usages of authenticate_image treat the result code as a simple binary.
The command line usage of authenticate_image directly returns the result
code of authenticate_image as a success/failure code.
Right now when calling hab_auth_img and test the result code in a shell a
passing hab_auth_img will appear to the shell as a fail.
The first step in fixing this behaviour is to fix-up the result code return
by authenticate_image() itself, subsequent patches fix the interpretation
of authenticate_image so that zero will return CMD_RET_SUCCESS and non-zero
will return CMD_RET_FAILURE.
The first step is fixing the return type in authenticate_image() so do that
now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Change is consistent with other SOCs and it is in preparation
for adding SOMs. SOC's related files are moved from cpu/ to
mach-imx/<SOC>.
This change is also coherent with the structure in kernel.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
CC: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
CC: Akshay Bhat <akshaybhat@timesys.com>
CC: Ken Lin <Ken.Lin@advantech.com.tw>
CC: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com>
CC: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
CC: "Sébastien Szymanski" <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
CC: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
CC: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
CC: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
CC: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com>
CC: Nikita Kiryanov <nikita@compulab.co.il>
CC: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
CC: "Eric Bénard" <eric@eukrea.com>
CC: Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com>
CC: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
CC: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
CC: Adrian Alonso <adrian.alonso@nxp.com>
CC: Alison Wang <b18965@freescale.com>
CC: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
CC: Martin Donnelly <martin.donnelly@ge.com>
CC: Marcin Niestroj <m.niestroj@grinn-global.com>
CC: Lukasz Majewski <lukma@denx.de>
CC: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
CC: "Albert ARIBAUD (3ADEV)" <albert.aribaud@3adev.fr>
CC: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
CC: Soeren Moch <smoch@web.de>
CC: Richard Hu <richard.hu@technexion.com>
CC: Wig Cheng <wig.cheng@technexion.com>
CC: Vanessa Maegima <vanessa.maegima@nxp.com>
CC: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com>
CC: Stefan Agner <stefan.agner@toradex.com>
CC: Markus Niebel <Markus.Niebel@tq-group.com>
CC: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
CC: Francesco Montefoschi <francesco.montefoschi@udoo.org>
CC: Jaehoon Chung <jh80.chung@samsung.com>
CC: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
CC: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
CC: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de>
CC: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
CC: "Andrew F. Davis" <afd@ti.com>
CC: "Łukasz Majewski" <l.majewski@samsung.com>
CC: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@st.com>
CC: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org>
CC: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
CC: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
CC: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
CC: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
CC: "Álvaro Fernández Rojas" <noltari@gmail.com>
CC: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
CC: Xiaoliang Yang <xiaoliang.yang@nxp.com>
CC: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
CC: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
CC: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
CC: Filip Brozovic <fbrozovic@gmail.com>
CC: Petr Kulhavy <brain@jikos.cz>
CC: Eric Nelson <eric@nelint.com>
CC: Bai Ping <ping.bai@nxp.com>
CC: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com>
CC: Sanchayan Maity <maitysanchayan@gmail.com>
CC: Lokesh Vutla <lokeshvutla@ti.com>
CC: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@st.com>
CC: Gary Bisson <gary.bisson@boundarydevices.com>
CC: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
CC: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
Add CAAM clock functions, SEC_CONFIG[1] fuse checking, and default CSF
size for HAB support boot on mx7ulp.
Users need to uncomment the CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT in mx7ulp_evk.h to build
secure uboot.
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by : Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
When using HAB as secure boot mechanism on Wandboard, the chain of
trust breaks immediately after the SPL. As this is not checking
the authenticity of the loaded image before jumping to it.
The HAB status output will not be implemented in SPL as it adds
a lot of strings that are only required in debug cases. With those
it exceeds the maximum size of the available OCRAM (69 KiB).
The SPL MISC driver support must be enabled, so that the driver can use OTP fuse
to check if HAB is enabled.
Cc: sbabic@denx.de
v2-Changes: None
Signed-off-by: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Support i.MX6DQPlus, otherwise wrong hab address will be used
for i.MX6QDPlus.
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <van.freenix@gmail.com>
Cc: Ulises Cardenas <Ulises.Cardenas@freescale.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Add i.MX6SOLO support for hab function.
The difference between i.MX6SOLO and i.MX6DL is
the number of CPU cores. Besides this, they work
the same.
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <van.freenix@gmail.com>
Cc: Bhuvanchandra DV <bhuvanchandra.dv@toradex.com>
Cc: "Benoît Thébaudeau" <benoit.thebaudeau.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Add mx7 secure boot support, add helper macro IS_HAB_ENABLED_BIT
to get the corresponding bit mask per SoC (mx7 or mx6) to identify
if securue boot feature is enabled/disabled.
On authenticate_image only check for mmu enabled on mx6 SoC to
force pu_irom_mmu_enabled so ROM code can perform mmu cache flush
mx7 SoC ROM code does not have this issue as ROM enables cache support
based on fuse settings.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Alonso <aalonso@freescale.com>
Rework secure boot support for imx6, move existing hab support
for imx6 into imx-common for SoC reuse.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Alonso <aalonso@freescale.com>
Since the i.MX6QP has fixed the issue in boot ROM, so remove the workaround
for i.MX6QP.
Signed-off-by: Ye.Li <B37916@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <Peng.Fan@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
hab_status command returns a memory dump of the hab event log. But the
raw data is not human-readable. Parsing such data into readable event
will help to minimize debbuging time.
Signed-off-by: Ulises Cardenas <Ulises.Cardenas@freescale.com>
When CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT is enabled, the signed images
like kernel and dtb can be authenticated using iMX6 CAAM.
The added command hab_auth_img can be used for HAB
authentication of images. The command takes the image
DDR location, IVT (Image Vector Table) offset inside
image as parameters. Detailed info about signing images
can be found in Freescale AppNote AN4581.
Signed-off-by: Nitin Garg <nitin.garg@freescale.com>
According to:
http://git.freescale.com/git/cgit.cgi/imx/uboot-imx.git/log/?h=imx_v2009.08_3.0.35_4.1.0
ENGR00287268 mx6: fix the secure boot issue on the new tapout chip
commit 424cb1a79e9f5ae4ede9350dfb5e10dc9680e90b
newer i.MX6 silicon revisions have an updated ROM and HAB API table.
Please see also:
i.MX Applications Processors Documentation
Engineering Bulletins
EB803, i.MX 6Dual/6Quad Applications Processor Silicon Revsion 1.2 to 1.3 Comparison
With this change the secure boot status is correctly displayed
Signed-off-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Add functions to report the HAB (High Assurance Boot) status
of e.g. i.MX6 CPUs.
This is taken from
git://git.freescale.com/imx/uboot-imx.git branch imx_v2009.08_3.0.35_4.0.0
cpu/arm_cortexa8/mx6/generic.c
include/asm-arm/arch-mx6/mx6_secure.h
Signed-off-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Tom Rini
Bryan O'Donoghue
Breno Lima
Utkarsh Gupta
Stefano Babic
Peng Fan
Sven Ebenfeld
Peng Fan
Adrian Alonso
Ye.Li
Ulises Cardenas
Nitin Garg