The DT spec demands a unit-address in a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings if this is
not the case.
Fix all occurences in various documentation files where this was not
observed, to not give bad examples to the reader.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
The DT spec demands a unit-address of a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings if this is
not the case.
Fix all occurences in the FIT image example files where this was not
observed, to not give bad examples to the reader.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
The DT spec demands a unit-address in a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings if this is
not the case.
Fix all occurences in the FIT image documentation files where this was not
observed, to not give bad examples to the reader.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Binman has 100% test coverage for the code as it is at present. To
encourage it to stay that way, run the code-coverage test as part of the
normal U-Boot tests.
This is RFC because it requires the Python code coverage tools to be
available.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
If lk lights up display and populates simple-framebuffer node, it will
also setup a reserved-memory node (needed by simplefb on linux). But
it isn't clever enough to cope when the reserved-memory node is not
present.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
We dont need to keep copies of the properties that we are going to
fixup since we will be using the dtb provided by the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge.ramirez-ortiz@linaro.org>
Similar to CONFIG_OF_BOARD, but in this case the fdt is still built by
u-boot build. This allows the board to patch the fdt, etc.
In the specific case of dragonboard 410c, we pass the u-boot generated
fdt to the previous stage of bootloader (by embedding it in the
u-boot.img that is loaded by lk/aboot), which patches the fdt and passes
it back to u-boot.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
[trini: Update board_fdt_blob_setup #if check]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
The firmware that runs before u-boot modifies u-boot's device tree
adding the local-mac-address and local-bd-address properties for the
compatibles "qcom,wcnss-bt" and "qcom,wcnss-wlan".
This commit reads that firmware, retrieves the properties and fixups
the device tree that is passed to the kernel before booting.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge.ramirez-ortiz@linaro.org>
This commit adds support for 96Boards Dragonboard820C.
The board is based on APQ8086 Qualcomm Soc, complying with the
96Boards specification.
Features
- 4x Kyro CPU (64 bit) up to 2.15GHz
- USB2.0
- USB3.0
- ISP
- Qualcomm Hexagon DSP
- SD 3.0 (UHS-I)
- UFS 2.0
- Qualcomm Adreno 530 GPU
- GPS
- BT 4.2
- Wi-Fi 2.4GHz, 5GHz (802.11ac)
- PCIe 2.0
- MIPI-CSI, MIPI-DSI
- I2S
U-Boot boots chained from LK (LK implements the fastboot protocol) in
64-bit mode.
For detailed build instructions see readme.txt in the board directory.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge.ramirez-ortiz@linaro.org>
In preparation to add support for the Dragonboard820c (APQ8096),
refactor the current Snapdragon clock driver.
No new functionality has been added.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge.ramirez-ortiz@linaro.org>
For example to store the environment in a file named "/uboot.env" in MMC
"0", where partition "1" contains the EXT4 filesystem, the following
configs should be added to the board's default config:
CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_EXT4=y
CONFIG_ENV_EXT4_DEVICE_AND_PART="0:1"
CONFIG_ENV_EXT4_FILE="/uboot.env"
CONFIG_ENV_EXT4_INTERFACE="mmc"
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge.ramirez-ortiz@linaro.org>
[trini: Fix some line over 80 chars issues]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode.
This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery
mode.
=> hab_failsafe
Shows the i.MX7 appear as "hiddev0,hidraw5: USB HID v1.10 Device [Freescale
SemiConductor Inc SP Blank ULT1] " in a Linux dmesg thus allowing download
of a new image via the BootROM USB download protocol routine.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for
hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address
layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks
will just do nothing and there's definitely a TODO to implement that extra
functionality on the alternative BootROM API.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The hab_rvt_failsafe() callback according to the HABv4 documentation:
"This function provides a safe path when image authentication has failed
and all possible boot paths have been exhausted. It is intended for use by
post-ROM boot stage components, via the ROM Vector Table."
Once invoked the part will drop down to its BootROM USB recovery mode.
Should it be the case that the part is in secure boot mode - only an
appropriately signed binary will be accepted by the ROM and subsequently
executed.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export
imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in
a secure-boot context.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot
unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the existing usages
of authenticate_image() expect and rely on unlocked boards doing the
following
1. Not calling into the BootROM authenticate_image() callback
2. Returning a pass status for authenticate_image() calls anyway
A previous patch removed the necessity to call into imx_hab_is_enabled()
twice. This patch ensures the reliance on authenticate_image() returning
zero is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to
interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is
renaming the relevant function to match the previously introduced external
naming convention imx_hab_function()
The name imx_hab_is_hab_enabled() is a tautology. A more logical name is
imx_hab_is_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with
imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in
the same way to make the fact we are doing IMX HAB activities clear from
reading the code. authenticate_image() could mean anything
imx_hab_authenticate_image() is on the other hand very explicit.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally.
Make them all static now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even
if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling into the ROM.
This can be confusing.
This patch changes the flow of the code so that the HAB event log is only
printed out if we have called into the ROM and received some sort of status
code.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity
check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over,
prior to making the BootROM authentication callback itself.
This check is recommended by the HAB documentation so it makes sense to
adhere to the guidance and perform that check as directed.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target()
for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case
the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just have HAB_SUCCESS
as a result code. Adding support for the new BootROM callbacks is a TODO.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The hab_rvt_check_target() callback according to the HABv4 documentation:
"This function reports whether or not a given target region is allowed for
either peripheral configuration or image loading in memory. It is intended
for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the ROM Vector Table, in
order to avoid configuring security-sensitive peripherals, or loading
images over sensitive memory regions or outside recognized memory devices
in the address map."
It is a useful function to support as a precursor to calling into
authenticate_image() to validate the target memory region is good.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch enables printout of the IVT entry, dcd and csf data fields.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT gives the absolute address of the CSF. There is no requirement for
the CSF to be located adjacent to the IVT so lets use the address provided
in the IVT header instead of the hard-coded fixed CSF offset currently in
place.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Previous patches added IVT header verification steps. We shouldn't call
hab_rvt_entry() until we have done the basic header verification steps.
This patch changes the time we make the hab_rvt_entry() call so that it
only takes place if we are happy with the IVT header sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT is a self-describing structure which contains a self field. The
self field is the absolute physical base address the IVT ought to be at in
memory. Use the IVT self field to validate the calculated ivt_addr bugging
out if the two values differ.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT header contains a magic number, fixed length and one of two version
identifiers. Validate these settings before doing anything with a putative
IVT binary.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The various i.MX BootROMs containing the High Assurance Boot (HAB) block
rely on a data structure called the Image Vector Table (IVT) to describe to
the BootROM where to locate various data-structures used by HAB during
authentication.
This patch adds a definition of the IVT header for use in later patches,
where we will break the current incorrect dependence on fixed offsets in
favour of an IVT described parsing of incoming binaries.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes
- addr - image hex address
- offset - hex offset of IVT in the image
but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats
the second 'offset' parameter as an image length.
Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end
of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4.
This patch fixes this situation by
1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img
- addr : image hex address
- length : total length of the image
- offset : offset of IVT from addr
2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in
arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass
addr, length and IVT offset respectively.
This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified
in the help text and should still allow existing code to work.
It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended
to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example.
Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the
BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images
made by mkimage via HAB.
This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will
focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not
mandated to live at the end of a .imx image.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
CSF_PAD_SIZE should be defined in hab.h, move it to that location now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The size of the IVT header should be defined in hab.h move it there now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The current code disjoins an entire block of code on hab_entry pass/fail
resulting in a large chunk of authenticate_image being offset to the right.
Fix this by checking hab_entry() pass/failure and exiting the function
directly if in an error state.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
There is no need to call is_enabled() twice in authenticate_image - it does
nothing but add an additional layer of indentation.
We can check for is_enabled() at the start of the function and return the
result code directly.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
authenticate_image returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. That result
code is mapped directly to the result code for the command line function
hab_auth_img - which means when hab_auth_img succeeds it is returning
CMD_RET_FAILURE (1) instead of CMD_RET_SUCCESS (0).
This patch fixes this behaviour by making authenticate_image() return 0 for
success and 1 for failure. Both users of authenticate_image() as a result
have some minimal churn. The upshot is once done when hab_auth_img is
called from the command line we set $? in the standard way for scripting
functions to act on.
Fixes: 36c1ca4d46 ("imx: Support i.MX6 High Assurance Boot
authentication")
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Andre Przywara
Simon Glass
Tom Rini
Rob Clark
Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz
Bryan O'Donoghue